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force beyond that of an advisory proceed-
ing of the chancellor ; and the reason is,
that the courts are not autborized tr
exert their power in that way. The doc-
trine stated by counsel is only correct
when the court proceeds after acquiring
jurisdiction of the cause, according to
the established mode governing the class
to which the case belongs, and does not
transcend in the extent or character of
its judgment, the law applicable to it."
In this case it was accordingly held that
a sentence of a court pronounced against
a party without hearing him or giving
him an opportunity to be heard, his ap-
pearance upon citation having been
stricken out and his right to appear
denied by the court, was not a judicial de-
termination of his rights and not entitled
to respect in any other tribunal, not-
withstanding the fact that up to the time
of striking out the defendant's appear-
ance, the court had jurisdiction beth of
the person and the subject-matter.
Upon a careful consideration of the
principal case, it seems to us that it would
have been equally within the power of
the court to have delegated the trial of the
issue of fact to the clerk of the court, the
sheriff, to arbitrators or any other volun-
tary tribunal, and that the sentence in the
- principal case, equally with one pro-
nounced upon a finding by such an irreg-
ular tribunal, is null and void. With'all
its faults as a tribunal for the administra-
tion of justice in criminal cases we are
.a believer in trial by jury. As an edu-
cator of the people, and as a means of
protection against the exercise of arbi-
trary power, its equal does not exist
under any other system of jurisprudence.
To it we are largely indebted for the
measure of liberty we enjoy to-day. Let
the law regulating it be amended, but
not repealed nor the beneficial results of
the systen abridged by any power short
of an amendment of the constitution by the
people. From a decision like that in the
principal case it is but a step to hold
that the denial of trial by jury in a
criminal case is a mere error, a decision
which in many cases would entirely de-
prive trial by jury of its chief good, its
power to protect against centralized and
arbitrary power. If the one is merely
error, so is the other. To our mind the
decision in the principal case is a danger-
ous precedent, and an unwarranted de-




ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.1
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
4
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH OAROLINA. 5
ADVANcEMENT.
Death of S on after receiving Advancement.-The acceptance by a son
of a conveyance of land from his father, in satisfaction of his share as pro-
1 Prepared expressly for the American Law Reigister, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term, 1885. The cases will probably appearin 117 U. S. Rep.
2 From Hon. N . L. Freeman, Reporter: to appear in 114 fIl. Rep.
3FRom Hon. W. S. Ladd, Reporter; to appear in 61 N. H. Rep.
'F rom George B. Okey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 44 Ohio St. Rep.
5 From Robert W. Shand, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 23 S. C. Rep.
404.
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spective heir in the father's estate, will not only bar his own right to
share in the distribution of his father's estate, real and personal, but also
that of his children, in case he should die before his father: Simpson
v. Simpson, 114 Ill.
ARBITRATION.
Attempt to influence Arbitrator-Setting aside .Award.-It is sufficient
to authorize a court of equity to enjoin a suit at law upon an award, and
set aside the award, that one of the parties in interest made a statement
to one of the arbitrators, in the absence of the adverse party, designed
and having a tendency to improperly affect his decision as an arbitrator
without showing that such statement, in fact, produced any harmful
result to such other party: Catlett v. Dougherty, 114 Ill.
A party to an arbitration who by overt acts attempts to corrupt or im-
properly influence the arbitrators, or any one of them, to make an award
in his favor, will not be heard to say that he was impotent to accomplish
what he sought, and to raise an issue thereupon : Id.
ATTACHMENT.
Purchaser for ralue-Lis Pendens.-A general attachment of all a
debtor's interest in real estate, in a town, does not hold land fraudulently
conveyed by the debtor by a deed recorded before the attachment, and
conveyed by his fraudulent grantee after the attachment to an innocent
purchaser for value: Ashland Savings Bank v. Mead, 61 N. H.
Against the latter and subsequent purchasers from him, such attach-
ment is not constructive notice of a lien, or of lis pendens : Id.
BANK. See Bills and Notes.
BANKRUPTCY.
Validity of Judgment obtained after Discharge in Suit commenced
prior to Fling of Petition.-Where suit was commenced in a state court
prior to filing by defendant of his petition in bankruptcy, on a debt
provable, but not proved thereunder, and judgment was obtained thereon
subsequent to the granting of a discharge to said bankrupt, held, in a
suit on said judgment in another state that the discharge could not be
pleaded as a bar thereto: Dimock- Revere Copper Co., S. 0. U. S., Oct.
Term 1885.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Bill of Lading - Transfer of Title-Drafts accompanying Bill-
National Ban.-A draft for a sum stated, drawn by the seller against a
buyer in favor of a national bank; by whom it is discounted or purchased,
with the bill of lading attached, passes title to the goods therein men-
tioned to the bank; and the bank may recover them, upon dishonor of
the draft from a sheriff who had seized the goods as the property of the
seller under attachment subsequent to.the purchase by the bank: Union
Nat. Bank v. Rowan, 23 S. 0.
A draft so drawn is a bill of exchange, and its purchase by a national
bank is not beyond the powers conferred by acts of Congress upon
national banks: Id.
CORPORATION.
Dissolution-Reversion of Property-Seal.-Upo, the dissolution of
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a corporation (other than a moneyed, trading, or municipal corporation)
by expiration of charter, all of its property not validly alienated before
dissolution reverts to the grantor: St. Phillip's Church v. Zion Presby-
terian Church, 23 S. C.
Where a corporation, having no adopted seal, directed a conveyance to
be made of a lot of land, and a deed was accordingly execut6d profess-
ing to be under the seal of the corporation, attested by the signature of
its president, and was signed by such president, and a wafer was attached,
which was intended to be the seal of the corporation., held, that the
wafer was the corporate seal to this deed : Id.
CUSTOMS DuTIEs.
Proprietm] Medicine, what is.-Sect. 2504, Schedule 31, p. 480
(2d ed.) Rev. Stat., imposes a tax of 50 per cent. ad valorem on pro-
prietary medicines, and the same schedule and section, p. 477, makes
the duty on calcined magnesia twelve cents. per pound. A certain firm
put up calcined magnesia in bottles, with their name blown thereon,
wrapped up in a circular which claimed peculiar excellence for their
preparation, cautioning purchasers against spurious imitations thereof,
and calling attention 'to their " trade mark" stamped thereon. The
process of calcining magnesia used by said firm was not a secret or
peculiar one, but the preparation sold by it did differ from ordinary cal-
cined magnesia (though used for the same purpose) in that the carbonic
acid was eliminated add the grit got rid of; and it had a peculiar. reputa-
tion and value in the market by -reason of the nicety with which it was
prepared. Held, that it was subject to tax as a proprietary medicine:
Ferguson v. Arthur, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
DAMAGES.
Diversion of Water-Proof of Loss of. Profits-Evidence.-In an
action of a lessee of a mill against his lessor for a diversion of water,
depriving the plaintiff of the demised water-power, damages for loss of
profits being claimed in the declaration, and loss of profits being a dam-
age the parties could have reasonably anticipated, proof of the profits
done at the mill is admissible on the question of damages: Crawford v.
Parsons, 61 N. H.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES. See Advancement.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
Determination of Vilue of Matter in Dispute.-In a suit to collect
interest due on certain bonds-of a railroad by the foreclosure of a mort-
gage made to trustees to secure a series of bonds aggregating $500,000,
the bill was dismissed. The suit was brought by two complainants for
themselves and all others in the like situation who might join with them,
but no one saw fit to join. The principal of complainants' bonds exceeded
$5000, but the interest, which the suit was brought to recover, was less.
Held, that the matter in dispute was less than the jurisdictional limit
of the United States Supreme Court; " Bruce v. Manchester & Keene
Rd., S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
EVIDENCE. See Will.
Judicial .Wotice-Distance from Seat of Government.-A statute of
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Montana provided that "all acts of the legislature declaring that they
should take effect from and after their passage, shall so take effect only
at the seat of government, and in other portions of the territory, allow-
ing fifteen miles from the seat of government for each day." Held,
that where, by reason of this statute, the question whether a certain law
was in effect at a certain time in a certain part of said territory, depended
upon the distance of that place from the seat of government; the dis-
tance was a fact of which the court was bound to take judicial notice
Hoyt v. Russell, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
FRAUD.
Deceit-Representations as to Remote Lands.-Where a party effects
an exchange of real estate situate in another state, with a person residing
in this state, for property here, by means of false representations as to
the quantity of his land, the location thereof, and the character of the
improvements thereon, with a knowledge of the falsity of his repre-
sentations, he will be liable to the injured party in an action on the case
for fraud and deceit. Under circumstances like these, the person with
whom the exchange is sought may rely upon the statements as being
true, without being guilty of such negligence as to preclude a recovery
by him for the fraud practised on him. It might be different where
the property is situated conveniently near, so as to permit an examina-
tion to be readily made: Ladd v. Pigott, 114 Ill.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Presumption.
Divorce-Allmony," defence to.-A judgment ordered for the defend-
ant upon an agreed statement of facts, which showed that the mortgage
in suit was given to secure the payment of a sum of money by a hus-
band to his wife, under a collusive agreement for obtaining a divorce
in her favor, is not conclusive against the rights of the wife, after such
divorce has been decreed, to recover alimony from the husband : Cross
v. Cross, 61 N. H1.
Nor is the adultery of the wife, both before and after such divorce, a
legal bar to the granting of alimony upon her petition subsequently
brought : 1d.
INFANT.
Decree of Court- Condusiveness.-A decree of the judge of probate
on the settlement of an administration account concludes an infant whose
guardian has notice and is present: Simmons v. Goodell, 61 N. H.
If an appeal is not taken, a decree has the same effect as the judg-
ment of a court of common law: Id.
Errors in the decree can be corrected only upon appeal; errors in the
record of the decree may be corrected at any time: Id.
INSURANCE.
Life Insurance-Failure to send Notice- Waiver of Tender of Pre-
mium.-Where, by the terms of a contract of life insurance, the bene-
ficiary named in the policy is entitled to participate in the profits, a
portion of which, in the form of dividends, is to be applied each year in
reduction of premiums, and it has been the uniform practice of the com-
pany to give timely notice of the amount of premium, amount of divi-
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dends, and of the balance to be paid in cash, and the company neglects
to give such notice, having knoledge of the residence of the bene-
ficiary, and by reason thereof a premium is not paid at the time specified
in the policy, the company cannot set up such failure to pay as a defence
to a recovery upon the policy, although by its terms the same is to be
forfeited in case of failure to pay a premium upon any of the dates stipu-
lated therein : Manhattan Ife Ins. Co. v. Smith, 44 Ohio St.
In such case, where the company has uniformly sent the notices to the
insured (the husband of the beneficiary) and he has made payment of
premiums from year to year, the law will treat him, in making such pay-
ments, as agent for the wife, but where it is shown to the company, by
letters from the husband, very shortly after notice sent, that he and the
wife have separated, she having commenced a proceeding for alimony
against him, and that he is desirous of having the policy changed and
made payable to his estate, the company is not justified in treating him
as her agent, for the purpose either of receiving notice for her, or of
making a surrender of the policy: .d.
Where, in such case, the company repudiates the contract, and by its
course of conduct, clearly indicates that a tender of the premium after
the death of the insured, if made, would not be accepted, a failure to
make such tender will not bar a recovery on the policy: id.
Agents-Limitation of Powers of-Representations not contained in
Written Application .- While the powers of an insurance agent are prima
facie co-extensive with the business intrusted to his care, yet an insur-
ance company, like any other principal, may limit the authority of its
agents, and thus bind all parties dealing with them with knowledge .of
the limitation: N. Y. Tfe Ins. Co. v. Vetcher, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1885.
The application for a policy of insurance contained a provision, that
no statements or representations made, or information given, to the per-
sons soliciting or taking the application for the policy, should be bind-
ing on the company, or in any manner affect its rights, unless they were
reduced to writing and presented at the home office in the application.
Held, that such a stipulation is binding upon the parties: Id.
IDMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
J.oint Sureti-.New Promise by one-Payment of Znterest.-Where
a principal and sureties gave their joint and several promissory note;
upon which, after maturity, the principal debtor, from time to time,
made several payments, the legal liability of all the parties to the note
was discharged at the expiration of six years from its maturity, and
thereafter action could be maintained only on the new promise implied
from the partial payments credited on the note: Walters v. Kraft, 23
S. C.
. But as such subsequent promise constituted a new contract and a
new cause of action, no one is liable except him whd made it; the lia-
bility of the sureties was not continued by the payments and promises
of the principal debtor: -7d.
The relation of agency does not exist between joint-debtors arising
from community of interest; their community of interest is confined to
the payment of the debt. Payment by a principal debtor cannot con-
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tinue the obligation of a surety, without his consent, beyond the period
fixed by the original contract: Id.
MANDAMUS.
Discretion of Inferior Court-Time of Probate of lill.-Where the
exercise of a discretion is involved, a writ of mandamus will not be
allowed against an inferior court or tribunal. So the discretion of the
county or probate court as to the time it will receive probate of a will,
or which of two papers purporting to be the wills of the same person,
shall be passed upon first, will not be interfered with by this writ:
People v. Knickerbocker, 114 Ill.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Discharge-But one Action .Maintainable.-Where an employee,
engaged under a contract for a specified time, the wages being payable
in instalments, is wrongfully discharged before the expiration of the
period of hire, and all wages actually earned at the time of the discharge
have been paid, an action will not lie to recover the future instalments,
as though actually earned, but the remedy is by action for damages
arising from the breach of the contract, and one recovery upon sucl"
claim is a bar to a future action: James v. Board of Commissioners
44 Ohio St.
Who are Fellow-Servants.-A locomotive engineer and a section-mastet
of track-workers are not fellow-servants in the sense that the railroad
company employing them would not be liable to one for damages result-
ing to him from the negligence of the other: Galvo v. Charlotte, Col. &
Aug. Rd. Co., 23 S. 0.
Where an engine is thrown from the track and the engineer injured
through the negligent violation of the rules of the company by a section-
master, the company is liable to the engineer, the section-master being a
representative of the company: 
Id.
Contributory Negligence-Promise to Remove Cause of Danger.-
Where a master or his representative has expressly promised to repair a
defect, the servant can recover fbr an injury caused thereby, within such
a period of time after the promise as it would be reasonable to allow for
its performance, or for an injury suffered within any period which would
not preclude a rational expectation that the promise might be kept ;
Provided, that the danger which the plaintiff apprehended from the
beginning was not so imminent or manifest as to prevent a reasonably
prudent man from risking it upon a promise or assurance by the proper
authority that the cause from which the peril arose would be removed
District of Columbia v. XlfcElligott. S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
Rough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 224, considered and applied: Id.
MORTGAGE.
Absolute Deed with Parol Defeasance-How Recorded.-A deed,
absolute in form, intended, however, to secure the payment of money
due from the maker to the grantee, and, upon the payment of which by
a certain time, the grantee agreed to reconvey the property to the grantor,
though in equity a mortgage, is not a legal one; and, to make it avail-
able as against creditors of the grantor, it need not be recorded as a
VoL. XXXIV.-52
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mortgage ; it is sufficient for such purpose, if it be recorded within the
time prescribed for the registratiob of all other deeds and instruments
of writing for the conveyance or incumbrance of lands in this state:
Xem ner v. Campbell, 44 Ohio St.
Notes secured by-Edorsement of-Pasment of one Note by E-
dorser-Priority as between Assisnee of Endorser and Holder of other
.Notes.-K. executed and delivered to T. three notes, payable to T.'s
order, due in one, two and three years from date, and a mortgage to
secure their payment. Before either note became due, T. endorsed the
notes, waiving demand and notice, and delivered both to A., with an
assignment of the mortgage. -The note maturing in one year not being
paid when due, was put in judgment against K. as maker and T. as
endorser. K. being insolvent, T. paid the judgment. He then com-
menced suit to foreclose the mortgage, claiming the benefit of the
mortgage security and a lien prior to the lien of A., who held the remain-
ing two notbs, which were then past due. A., by answer and cross-
petition, alleged facts showing T.'s liability as endorsor upon the two
notes, that K. was insolvent, that the lands would prove insufficient to
satisfy the whole mortgage debt, claiming priority of lien, praying fore-
closure and fRll -relief. Later, S., on his motion, became plaintiff, and
filed supplemental petition averring purchase from T., and assignment
of all his rights and interest in the mortgage and as plaintiff in the suit,
and claiming priority of lien. The land was sold. The sum realized
was not sufficient to satisfy the whole indebtedness. Held, that A. was
entitled to payment in full from the proceeds before application of the
money to the claim of S.: Anderson v. Sharp, 44 Ohio St.
Omission of word Heirs -Intention.-By a well-established general
rule the use of the word "heirs" or other appropriate words of per-
petuity in a mortgage or other deed of convdyance of lands, is essential
to pass a fee simple estate ; but this is not an inflexible rule admitting
of no exception or qualification: Brown v. First Rat. Bank of Hamil-
ton, 44 Ohio St.
Where the language employed in, and the recitals and conditions of,
a mortgage plainly evidence an intention to pass the entire estate of the
mortgagor as security for the mortgage debt, and the express provisions
of the instrument cannot otherwise be carried into effect, it will be con-
strued to pass such estate, although the word " heirs" or other formal
word of perpetuity is not employed: Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Increase of Indebtedness beyond Constitutional Ltmit-Defence to pro
ceeding to improve Street.-The fact that a city has already exhausted
its constitutional power to incur a debt, can not be shown to defeat a
proceeding by it to improve a street by special assessment in part, and
partly by general taxation. That question can not arise until the city
seeks to borrow money or incur an indebtedness in that regard: Jack-
sonville Ry. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 114 Ill.
Bonds of- When Excess of Issue Invalid.-A county court was
authorized to issue bonds for a subscription to such an amount of the
stock of a railroad as should be proposed by certain commissioners and
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approved by a majority of the voters of the county. Held, that bonds
issued in excess of this amount were void, and that the certificate of the
judge of the county court upon the back of each bond that it was issued
as authorized by the statute, and by an order of the county court in
pursuance thereof, cannot estop the county to deny that the particular
bond is void, because the county court, at the time of its issue, had
exhausted the power conferred by the act of the legislature and the vote
of the people ; nor can the payment of interest on all the bonds ratify
bonds issued beyond the lawful limit, as the county cannot ratify what
it could not have authorized: County of Davies v. Dickinson, S. 0. U.
S., Oct. Term 1885.
NEGLIGENCE. See Master and Servant.
Railroad- Trespasser.-While a railroad company cannot be said to
owe no duty to one who unlawfully intrudes himself upon its engines or
cars, it does not owe to him the same duty that it owes to a passenger,
or even to one of its employees: Darwin v. Charlotte, Col. & Aug. Rd.
Co., 23 S. C.
Where a trespasser gets, without authority, upon the most dangerous
place on a railroad engine and is killed, he is guilty of contributory
negligence, and no recovery of damages for his death can be obtained
against the company, even if the company had been guilty of negligence,
and although the engineer knew the person was in such place of danger
and did not warn him off. In the case of a passenger, the rule would be
different: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
Contract with one Member of irm, for Interest in PFrofits-Dissolu-
tion-Notice by Mail.-A person may contract with a particular member
of a firm for an interest in his share of the profits, without making him-
self a member of such firm and liable for its debts: Meyer v. .Krohn,
114 Il1.
Proof of the mailing of notices of the dissolution of a partnership and
of the retirement of certain members thereof, properly addressed to
persons having had prior dealings with the firm, is primafacie evidence
that the notices have been received by the parties to whom they were
addressed; but such presumption may be rebutted by proof that they
were not received: Id.
PATENT.
Infri nqement-Measure of Damages.-Paintiff was patentee of a
combination lock, the essential feature of which was the turning-bolt.
He granted no licenses, but manufactured the locks himself, being fully
able to supply the demand. Defendant, infringing on plaintiff's patent,
sold a lock having the turning-bolt device, at a reduced price, forcing
the latter to do the same in order to hold his trade. Held, that defend-
ant's infringement must be considered to have caused the entire loss of
the plaintiff by a reduction of prices, after allowing a proper sum for any
other patented device cont'ained in the defendant's locks and for any
other causes which gave to the defendant an advantage in selling his
locks: Yale Lock Co. v. Sargent, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
PLEADING.
Joinder of Covenant and Case.-Counts in covenant and case may
be joined in a declaration on a single cause of action; "rawford v. Par-
sons, 61 N. H.
POWER.
Trust-Exercise of Power by Donee for his own Benefit.-Where a
testator invests his widow with a life estate in his property, with power
to dispose of the remainder to his heirs, an attempted appointment o'f it
in such manner as to secure to herself a substantial pecuniary benefit
from its disposition, not authorized by the testator, is an abuse of such
power of appointment and is void : Shank v. Dewitt, 44 Ohio St.
An innocent motive or an honest misconstruction of the power con-
ferred will not save the exercise of the power, if the true purpose of it
is violated: Id.
lRIROAD. See Negligence.
PREsuMTmON. See Surety; Partnership.
Confli cinq Presumptions- Validty of 2farriage.-Where a marriage
in fact is shown, the law raises a strong presumption in favor of its
legality, and the burden of proof is on the party contesting its validity
to show that it is not valid: Johnson v. Johnson, 114 II.
So, although the presumption in favor of the validity of a marriage in
fact, and of the innocence of the contracting parties, may conflict with
that of the continued life of a former husband or wife not heard from
for a period less than seven years prior to the second marriage, yet if
neither presumption is aided by proof of facts or circumstances co-oper-
ating with it, the presumption of the validity of the second marriage
must prevail over the other: Id.
SunETY. See Limitations, Statute of.
Extension of Time for Princpal--Presumptio of Payment.-Where
a creditor receives from the principal debtor payment of interest in
advance on a past due note, an agreement to give time is necessarily
implied, and the creditor thereby debars himself of suing meantime on
the note, and the surety is therefore discharged-unless the creditor can
show mistake, or, possibly an agreement that the right of suit should not
be suspended: Gardner v. Gardner, 23 S. 0.
The question whether a sealed note which matured in 1860, and was
credited with payments by the principal debtor down to 1865, should
be presumed paid as to the sureties in 1884, raised but not considered: Id.
TAXATION.
Exemption from, a Franchise-Loss by Non- User.-Exemption from
taxation, being a special privilege granted by the government to an indi-
vidual, either in gross or as appurtenant to his freehold, is a franchise;
and a presumption of the surrender of this franchise may arise from long
acquiescence in actual taxation, which the government may take advan-
tage of, though the same period of non-user would be a ground of forfeit-
ure in a direct proceeding on the part of the state to revoke the fran-
chise : State of New Jersey v. Wright, S. 0. U. S. Oct. Term 1885.
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TRUST.
-Resulting Trust-Expenditure of Money in Improving Land.-An
interest in land does not pass, by resulting trust, from the owner to one
whose money is expended in improving the land: Bodwell v. N'utter,
61 N. H.0
Religious Use-Transfer to Persons of different Denominations.-
Where land was conveyed to be held in trust for the erection of a
church and academy for the benefit of a Lntheran congregation, the
church council could not transfer to others who were not Lutherans, or
to a town council, any portion of the land for the establishment of an
academy or school: Busbee v. .Mitchell, 23 S. 0.
Resulting Trust- When it Arises-Laches.-Where a party receives
money of another, to be invested in the purchase of land, and pays out
the same, with other money of his own, in a purchase, taking a deed in
his own name, he will hold the land so acquired in trust for the person
whose money he has so used, in the proportion it bears to the entire con-
sideration paid: Springer v. Springer, 114 Ill.
A party who takes a conveyance of land in his own name, partly paid
for with the money of another placed in his hands, can not set up, as a
defence to a bill to enforce a resulting trust, the laches or delay of the
complainant for the time he has admitted and recognised his equitable
rights. Such defence will avail him only from the time he sets up an
adverse claim, and denies the complainant's rights: Id.
Resulting Trust-Evidence after great lapse of Time.-The evidence
to establish a resulting'trust after the lapse of fifteen or sixteen years,
and especially after many of the principal witnesses having knowledge
of the facts are dead, should be of the most satisfactory kind. If the
evidence fails to satisfy the court that the money paid for the land was
that of the party seeking to establish the trust, no resulting trust can
be declared : Heneke v. Floring, 114 Ill.
Where a resulting trust is sought to be established after the lapse of
many years, on the ground that complainant's money was used in pay-
ing for the same, and that complainant's wife, by conspiracy and fraud,
had the conveyance made to her imbecile son by a former marriage, it
is incumbent on the plaintiff to establish these facts by very clear and
satisfactory evidence, and failing to do so, he can have no relief: Id.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
Purchase by Vendee of Superior T'tie.-The purchaser of land, while
in possession under his contract of purchase, is under no obligation to
maintain his vendor's title, and the law does not forbid him from buying
an outstanding title to the premises, and asserting it against his vendor:
Green v. Deitrich, 114 Ill.
So where the purchaser entered into possession under an agreement
that the purchase-money was not to be paid unless the vendor should,
within three years, make him a warranty deed conveying a perfect title,
and in case of failure to make him such conveyance the purchaser was to
remain in possession of the premises for the period of three years, and
pay a reasonable rent for the time he could hold peaceable possession,
and before the expiration of the three years he acquired the title from
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
other parties, it was held, that there was nothing in the relation of the
parties, under the original contract or otherwise, that prevented the pur-
chaser from yielding to the supgrior title and purchasing the same, and
in that way secure his peace: Id.
WILL. See Mandamus.
Remainder- Vesting-Conversion.-A. by his will gave $10,000 to
B. in trust for C., the income to be paid to C. for life, with remainder to
the children of C., if she had any, and if she had none, then to D. C.
had no children. D. died in the lifetime of C., leaving one child. Beld,
that the remainder became vested in D. immediately on the death of the
testator, subject to be divested by the birth of a child to C., and that, on
the death of C. without children, the fund passed to the heir-at-law of
D. : Vandewalker v. Rollins, 61 N. H.
The quality of property for purposes of transmission by will or inherit-
ance is not-changed from the character in which the testator or intestate
eft it, unless there is some clear act or intention by which he has
impressed upon it a definite character either as money or land. And
when, for the security of the fund, money is converted into land by a
judicial decree, the land is substituted for the fund and goes to the
person who would have taken the fund had it remained specifically per-
sonal estate: .d.
Testamentary Capa ity- Undue Influence- roof of Will.-On the
question of testamentary capacity, the will itself is evidence: Whitman
v. Morey, 61 N. H.
On the question of undue influence, the proponent of the will .may
show that nominal legacies to heirs other than children were inserted at
the suggestion of the person who wrote the will, because he erroneously
supposed it necessary to the validity of the will: Id.
When portions of a deposition are read by one party for the purpose
of contradicting the witness who gave it, the other party may read, from
the same deposition, so much as pertains to the same subject, and tends
to explain, qualify, or limit what is so read: Id.
The practice of requiring an executor, upon the issues of insanity and
undue influence, to call all the subscribing witnesses to the will, if alive,
sane, and within the jurisdiction, should not be departed from without
good cause: Id.
Whether a party shall be allowed to put leading questions to his own
witness is determined by the presiding justice while the examinatiQn of
the witness is going on before him, and is not matter of exception : Id.
The common-law rule, forbidding a party to discredit his witness, has
no application when the party, by legal intendment, has no choice, as in
the case of an attesting witness : .1d.
Upon the issues of insanity and undue influence, declarations of the
testator, tending to show the state of his feelings toward relatives to
whom he gave only a nominal sum, may be received: Id.
Revocation.-.:Evidence.-The revocation of a will is not effected by
the death of legatees or devisees named in it; nor by the marriage of the
testator, there being no issue of the marriage ; nor by the alienation of
the larger portion of his estate, which was specifically disposed of by the
will; nor by the acquisition of other estate to an amount much greater
